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LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCES
OVERVIEW
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided a surprisingly small
number of controversies involving lands and natural resources during the
time period covered by the Tenth Annual Tenth Circuit Survey. The subject
matter of the few land and resource decisions was also limited. Whereas in
recent years the court has considered a wide variety of resource and land
issues,' the past year is distinguished by its lack of variety. Of the eight land
and resource decisions published by the court,
2 six concerned public lands, 3
one involved Indian lands,4 and one resolved an environmental law ques-
tion. 5 This survey will highlight the issues resolved in each of these cases.
I. PUBLIC LANDS
A. Bounday Disputes
In a routine application of established principles, the court resolved a
boundary-line dispute concerning privately held lands bordering a national
forest. 6 The interesting aspect of the case, however, is the court's announce-
ment of an additional requirement for establishing estoppel against the gov-
ernment in boundary disputes involving federal land patents.
Sweeten v. United States Department of Agriculture Forest Service 7 was an ac-
tion to quiet title to a parcel of land bordering a national forest. Although
Sweeten believed the land to be hers, a Forest Service survey, which was
based on a previous resurvey that reestablished a lost corner of the section
encompassing Sweeten's land,8 indicated Sweeten's fence encroached on na-
tional forest property. 9 After receiving notice of her alleged encroachment,
Sweeten attempted to quiet title' 0 by attempting to prove that the resurvey
1. See Lands and Natural Resources, Ninth Annual Tenth Circuit Survey, 60 DEN. L.J. 333 (1983);
Lands and Natural Resources, Eighth Annual Tenth Circuit Survey, 59 DEN. L.J. 335 (1982); Lands and
Natural Resources, Seventh Annual Tenth Circuit Survey, 58 DEN. L.J. 415 (1981).
2. This discussion of the number of land and resource decisions of the court does not
include non-published opinions or cases based on diversity jurisdiction.
3. Nevada Power Co. v. Watt, 711 F.2d 913 (10th Cir. 1983); Stewart Capital Corp. v.
Andrus, 701 F.2d 846 (10th Cir. 1983); Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Ass'n v. Watt, 696 F.2d
734 (10th Cir. 1982); City and County of Denver v. Bergland, 695 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1982);
Ahrens v. Andrus, 690 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1982); Sweeten v. United States Dep't of Agriculture
Forest Service, 684 F.2d 679 (10th Cir. 1982).
4. Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Andrus, 687 F.2d 1324 (10th Cir. 1982).
5. Johnston v. Davis, 698 F.2d 1088 (10th Cir. 1983).
6. Sweeten v. United States Dep't of Agriculture Forest Service, 684 F.2d 679 (10th Cir.
1982).
7. Id
8. Public lands have been divided on a rectangular grid system since 1785. P. GATES,
HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 64-65 (1968). A section is a square land area
containing 640 acres. 43 U.S.C. § 751 para. 3 (1976).
9. 684 F.2d at 680.
10. 28 U.S.C. § 2409a (1982) permits the United States to be joined as a defendant in quiet
title actions involving lands in which the United States claims an interest.
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impermissibly reduced the rights granted by her original patent," and by
arguing that the government was estopped to deny that her fence was the
true property boundary.'
2
1. Validity of the Resurvey
The location of a disputed boundary is a question of fact.' 3 The circuit
court's review was therefore limited to a determination of whether the trial
court's findings were clearly erroneous.' 4 Because the trial court's determi-
nation that the resurvey established the true boundary was based on ade-
quate evidence, this finding was upheld by the Tenth Circuit.' 5
Sweeten then argued that the resurvey was invalid as a matter of law
because it impaired her ownership rights. 16 The patent to her land con-
veyed a specific amount of acreage described in metes and bounds.' 7
Sweeten contended that the stated acreage reflected the true extent of her
ownership rights, and that the resurveys were invalid because they reduced
her total acreage.'" The Tenth Circuit dismissed this argument, observing
that a metes and bounds description was generally more persuasive evidence
of the scope of a conveyance.' 9 Because Sweeten's ownership rights were
limited by the metes and bounds description, the Forest Service's accurate
resurveys could not impair her ownership rights.
20
2. Estoppel
The Tenth Circuit also denied Sweeten's claim that the government
was estopped to deny that her fence was the boundary line.2 1 In so doing
the Tenth Circuit recognized that in addition to the four traditional ele-
ments of estoppel,22 a fifth requirement must be established to estop the gov-
ernment in boundary disputes involving federal land patents. 23 The fifth
11. See 43 U.S.C. § 772 (1976). This statute provides in relevant part that "no . . . resur-
vey [of public lands] . . . shall be so executed as to impair the bona fide rights or claims of any
claimant, entryman, or owner of lands affected by such resurvey. ... Id
12. 684 F.2d at 681.
13. Id Accord United States v. State Inv. Co., 264 U.S. 206, 211 (1924); United States v.
Doyle, 468 F.2d 633, 636 (10th Cir. 1972).
14. 684 F.2d at 681.
15. Id
16. Id See supra note 11.
17. 684 F.2d at 681 n.3.
18. Id at 681-82.
19. Id at 682 & n.4.
20. Id
21. Id at 682. Sweeten also argued that the fence was the basis for a finding of ownership
through adverse possession or boundary by acquiescence. Id The court summarily rejected
these claims, noting that title to public lands cannot be acquired through doctrines designed to
resolve private disputes. Id (citing United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 39-40 (1947)).
22. The four traditional elements of estoppel are:
1) The party to be estopped must know the facts; 2) He must intend that his conduct
shall be acted on or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel has a right to
believe it is so intended; 3) The latter must be ignorant of the true facts; and 4) He
must rely on the former's conduct to his injury.
684 F.2d at 682 n.5 (quoting United States v. Ruby Co., 588 F.2d 697, 703 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
dntied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979)).
23. 684 F.2d at 682.
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element requires the party asserting estoppel to prove affirmative miscon-
duct on the part of the government. 24 Because no affirmative misconduct
was evident, Sweeten's estoppel claim was denied.
2 5
Judge Barrett disagreed only with the majority's holding that a fifth
element, affirmative misconduct, must be proved in order to estop the gov-
ernment in federal land patent boundary cases. 26 Judge Barrett stated the
traditional elements of estoppel were sufficient in these cases and indicated
that the flexibility of the traditional estoppel doctrine would better effect just
and fair decisions.
2 7
In summary, it is clear that the Tenth Circuit will hereafter require a
showing of affirmative misconduct on behalf of the government in order to
estop the government in boundary disputes involving federal land patents.
The requirement of proving affirmative misconduct means the government
will be estopped in only the most flagrant cases.
B. Construction of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976
1. Mineral Leasing in Wilderness Study Areas
In Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Association v. Watt 28 (RMOGA) the Tenth
Circuit construed the "grandfather clause" of section 603(c) of the Federal
Land Policy and Management Act of 197629 (FLPMA) in order to deter-
mine whether the Department of Interior (Interior) interpretation of the sec-
tion was reasonable.
RMOGA had its inception in a 1978 interpretation of section 603(c) is-
24. Id The additional requirement was first applied in United States v. Ruby Co., 588
F.2d 697, 703 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979).
25. 684 F.2d at 682.
26. Id at 682 (Barrett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
27. Id at 682-83. Judge Barrett also stated that in some circumstances compelling reasons
of public policy might prevent recognition of estoppel against the government. Id at 683. This
emphasis echoes Judge McKay's dissent in Home Say. & Loan Assoc. v. Nimmo, 695 F.2d 1251
(10th Cir. 1982) (McKay, J., dissenting), where Judge McKay views separation of powers con-
cerns as a policy limitation on estopping the government. Id. at 1260-61.
28. 696 F.2d 734 (10th Cir. 1982).
29. 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) (1976). Section 603(c) contains the congressionally mandated
standards under which the Secretary of Interior (Secretary) is required to manage Bureau of
Land Management (BLM) lands under review for designation as wilderness areas. The section
states:
During the period of review of such areas and until Congress has determined
otherwise, the Secretary shall continue to manage such lands . . . in a manner so as
not to impair the suitability of such areas for preservation as wilderness, subject, how-
ever, to the continuation of existing mining and grazing uses and mineral leasing in
the manner and degree in which the same was being conducted on October 21, 1976:
Provided, That, in managing the public lands the Secretary shall by regulation or
otherwise take any action required to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of
the lands and their resources or to afford environmental protection. Unless previously
withdrawn from appropriation under the mining laws, such lands shall continue to be
subject to such appropriation during the period of review unless withdrawn by the
Secretary under the procedures of section 1714 of this title for reasons other than pres-
ervation of their wilderness character.
Id.
The "grandfather clause" is that portion of section 603(c) which states that the non-impair-
ment management standard is "subject . . . to the continuation of existing mining and grazing
uses and mineral leasing in the manner and degree in which the same was being conducted on
October 21, 1976. ... Id See 696 F.2d at 746-47.
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sued by the Solicitor of the Department of Interior (Solicitor).30 The Solici-
tor's opinion stated that all activities that were not protected by the section
603(c) grandfather clause 3 1 were to be regulated pursuant to the general
nonimpairment standard provided in the section. 32 The opinion then inter-
preted the grandfather clause as applying only to actual, on-the-ground uses
as they existed on the date of FLPMA's enactment. 33 Thus, any new uses or
modifications in existing uses would only be permitted if the requested use
would not impair an area's suitability for preservation as wilderness.
34
The Solicitor's opinion, along with stringent Interior Department leas-
ing guidelines promulgated following the opinion, resulted in an almost total
cessation of mineral development in Wilderness Study Areas (WSA's). 35
The Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Association challenged the Solicitor's in-
terpretation of section 603(c) as being arbitrary and capricious and contrary
to law, and requested declaratory and injunctive relief from Interior's appli-
cation of the nonimpairment standard to mineral leasing within WSA's.
3 6
The district court granted the requested relief, holding that because section
603(c) unambiguously required active development of mineral leasing, 37 In-
terior's restrictive regulations were an invalid exercise of administrative
authority.
38
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court and upheld the
regulations that were based on the Solicitor's opinion. 39 After a preliminary
discussion of the overall policy and purpose of FLPMA,4° the Tenth Circuit
examined the district court's interpretation of section 603(c). The Tenth
Circuit disagreed with the district court's characterization of section 603(c)
as unambiguous and therefore delved into the section's legislative history to
determine which mineral lease activities the grandfather clause exempted
30. 86 Interior Dec. 91 (1978) (formal opinion).
31. See supra note 29.
32. 86 Interior Dec. at 99-109. See supra note 29.
33. Id. at II1-15.
34. Id at 111-12 (interpreting section 603(c)'s grandfather exception for "existing mining
and grazing uses" to apply only to activities actually taking place on FLPMA's effective date);
id at 114-15 (interpreting section 603(c)'s grandfather exception for "existing mineral leasing"
to apply only to lease development activities actually taking place on FLPMA's effective date).
35. Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Andrus, 500 F. Supp. 1338, 1342 (D. Wyo. 1980),
rev'dsub nom. Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Watt, 696 F.2d 734 (10th Cir. 1982). Wilder-
ness Study Areas (WSA's) are lands which have been identified as roadless areas of 5,000 acres
or more, or roadless islands. See 43 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1976). Once designated as a WSA an area
is evaluated to determine whether it should be designated as a wilderness area under the Wil-
derness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1982). See 43 U.S.C. § 1781(a) (1976). Section
603(c), codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) (1976), is designed to protect the WSA's while they are
evaluated for designation as a wilderness area.
36. Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Andrus, 500 F. Supp. 1338, 1342 (D. Wyo. 1980),
rev'dsub nom. Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Watt, 696 F.2d 734 (10th Cir. 1982).
37. 500 F. Supp. at 1344-45.
38. Id at 1344.
39. Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Watt, 696 F.2d 734, 750 (10th Cir. 1982).
40. Id at 738-39. The court ruled on two jurisdictional issues prior to discussing the merits
of the case. First, the court held that the case was ripe for decision because the solicitor's opin-
ion was final agency action resulting in significant, ongoing financial harm to RMOGA's mem-
bers. Id at 741-42. Second, the court held that RMOGA was not required to exhaust
administrative remedies because the merits of the case involved a question of statutory interpre-
tation previously ruled on by the agency. Id at 743-44.
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from application of the nonimpairment standard. Based on its interpreta-
tion of congressional intent, the court ruled that section 603(c)'s grandfather
clause exempted mineral lease development in WSA's only "in the manner
and degree actually occurring on October 21, 1976."4 1 Interior's policy of
subjecting new or changed mineral lease activity to the nonimpairment stan-
dard was therefore upheld.
4 2
As a result of RMOGA, additional mineral leasing development will
not-as a practical matter-take place in WSA's. The opinion in effect in-
terprets section 603(c) as permitting stricter land management standards for
WSA's than those provided for lands designated as Wilderness Areas, where
mineral development was allowed through 1984. 4 3 RMOGA therefore inter-
prets FLPMA to require less mineral development in potential Wilderness
Areas than was allowed in existing Wilderness Areas.
2. Cost Reimbursement for Right-of-Way Applications
A Department of Interior (Interior) cost reimbursement regulation
promulgated under the authority of FLPMA was the subject of a challenge
in the consolidated case of Nevada Power Co. v. Wall .44 The regulation at
issue required an applicant for a right-of-way over federal lands to reimburse
the government for administrative and other costs incurred in processing the
application. 45 The regulation, on its face, is not contrary to the FLPMA
provisions that authorize the Secretary to require reimbursement of reason-
able costs associated with the application process. 46 By Secretarial Order,
41. Id at 750.
42. Id Activity exempt from the nonimpairment standard remains subject to reasonable
environmental protection regulations. See 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) (1976).
43. See 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(3) (1982).
44. 711 F.2d 913 (10th Cir. 1983).
45. The challenged regulation provided:
An applicant for a right-of-way grant or a temporary use permit shall reimburse the
United States for administrative and other costs incurred by the United States in
processing the application, including the preparation of reports and statements pursu-
ant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347),
before the right-of-way grant or temporary use permit shall be issued under the regula-
tions of this title.
43 C.F.R. § 2803.1-1(a) (1983).
46. Two FLPMA provisions authorize the Secretary to collect the reasonable costs associ-
ated with processing applications from right-of-way applicants. Section 504(g) provides:
The Secretary. . .may, by regulation or prior to promulgation of such regulations, as
a condition of a right-of-way, require an applicant for or holder of a right-of-way to
reimburse the United States for all reasonable administrative and other costs incurred
in processing an application for such right-of-way and in inspection and monitoring of
construction, operation, and termination of the facility pursuant to such right-of-
way....
43 U.S.C. § 1764(g) (1976).
Section 304 provides:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary may establish reason-
able filing and service fees and reasonable charges, and commissions with respect to
applications and other documents relating to the public lands and may change and
abolish such fees, charges, and commissions.
(b) The Secretary is authorized to require a deposit of any payments intended to
reimburse the United States for reasonable costs with respect to applications and other
documents relating to such lands. . . . As used in this section 'reasonable costs' in-
clude, but are not limited to, the costs of special studies; environmental impact state-
ments; monitoring construction, operation, maintenance, and termination of any
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however, the "reasonable costs" language of FLPMA and the "administra-
tive and other costs" language of the regulation were defined to mean "ac-
tual CoStS". 4 7 As a result of this interpretation, right-of-way applicants were
being charged the full, actual costs of processing their applications. 48 Nevada
Power involved several power company challenges to the practice of requir-
ing reimbursement of actual costs incurred in processing electric transmis-
sion line right-of-way applications.
49
In Nevada Power each utility alleged that FLPMA required the Bureau
of Land Management (BLM) to consider specifically the factors listed in
section 304(b) of FLPMA50 when establishing its reasonable reimbursement
costs, and that BLM had breached this statutory duty.5 The utilities also
argued that BLM could not, as a matter of law, require reimbursement for
the entire cost of any environmental impact statement (EIS) required by a
right-of-way application. 52 BLM, conversely, insisted that application of the
reasonableness factors was purely discretionary, and that its regulations were
therefore valid even absent consideration of the statutory factors.
53 Simi-
larly, they insisted that the full cost of an EIS could be included in the reim-
bursement charges.
54
In resolving this conflict, the Tenth Circuit carefully examined the legis-
lative history of section 304(b). 55 That examination indicated that Congress
had included the specific factors in section 304(b) to prevent Interior from
routinely assessing the full cost of an application." Essentially, Congress
included the reasonableness factors in the statute to guide the Secretary in
his determination of reasonable costs; the Secretary, therefore, was required
to consider the factors in determining how much of the actual cost would be
charged to the applicant. 57 Because the reimbursement regulation had not
been promulgated after consideration of the statutorily mandated reasona-
authorized facility; or other special activities. In determining whether costs are rea-
sonable under this section, the Secretary may take into consideration actual costs (ex-
clusive of management overhead), the monetary value of the rights or privileges
sought by the applicant, the efficiency to the government processing involved, that
portion of the cost incurred for the benefit of the general public interest rather than for
the exclusive benefit of the applicant, the public service provided, and other factors
relevant to determining the reasonableness of the costs.
43 U.S.C. § 1734 (1976).
47. The Secretarial Order stated in pertinent part:
It is my fmdng that "reasonable costs" under Sectbns /sic/ 304 of FLPMA for processing
applications for rights-of-way over public lands and for monitoring right-of-way
holder activity, are the actual costs incurred by the United States in performing statutory
responsibilities necessitated by such applications or rights-of-way. The term "reason-
able costs" means the same as the term "administrative and other costs" as used in the
regulations . . .and includes costs incurred in preparation of environmental impact
statements.
Secretarial Order No. 3011, 42 Fed. Reg. 55,280 (1977) (emphasis added).
48. Nevada Power Co. v. Watt, 711 F.2d 913, 916 (10th Cir. 1983).
49. Id. at 918-19.
50. 43 U.S.C. § 1734(b) (1976). See supra note 46.
51. 711 F.2d at 919.
52. Id at 929.
53. Id at 919.
54. Se id. at 918, 929.
55. Id at 921-25.
56. Id at 924.
57. Id at 925.
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bleness factors, the court held that the regulation was invalid.58
The Tenth Circuit also held that Interior could not charge the full cost
of an EIS to right-of-way applicants.5 9 The benefit of a required EIS inured
partially to the applicant and partially to the general public.60 Thus, be-
cause the statutory requirement to assess only reasonable costs required con-
sideration of the public benefits accruing from bestowing a private benefit, 6 1
the full cost of an EIS could not be charged to the applicant.
62
In summary, the Nevada Power decision mandates that Interior consider
the statutorily enumerated reasonableness factors when calculating the costs
that will be passed on to a right-of-way applicant. Consideration of these
factors will usually result in payment of less than full reimbursement costs by
the applicant. 63 In any case, the right-of-way applicant benefits because In-
terior cannot assess that portion of the cost of an EIS which results in general
public benefit.
64
C. Oil and Gas Leasing Regulattons
The court decided two narrow questions concerning a BLM interpreta-
tion of regulations controlling simultaneous filings for noncompetitive oil
and gas leases. These regulations set forth the specific procedural and sub-
stantive requirements for filing a valid simultaneous lease application. 65 In
Ahrens v. Andrus,66 the Tenth Circuit rejected a BLM ruling requiring that
the date of execution be shown for each separate signature on a lease appli-
cation (also known as a lease drawing entry card or DEC).
6 7
Because the Ahrens DEC's did not have dated signatures, the BLM re-
jected the applications and issued the leases to the next qualified parties. 68 In
overturning the BLM decision, the court reasoned that a signature date re-
quirement served no important purpose because the only significant date for
BLM purposes was the filing date of the DEC.69 The court therefore fol-
lowed a prior Tenth Circuit opinion 70 which held that denying an applica-
58. Id at 926-27. The court noted, however, that in some instances, consideration of the
statutory factors might result in a determination that actual cost reimbursement was reason-
able. Id at 925 n.6.
59. Id. at 928-29.
60. Id at 928 (citing Alumet v. Andrus, 607 F.2d 911 (10th Cir. 1979)).
61. 711 F.2d at 930. See supra note 46.
62. The court rejected the utilities' argument that assessing the full cost of the benefit
would be an unconstitutional exercise of the taxing power. Id at 929-30. Because the EIS cost
was a necessary part of granting a special benefit to the utilities, the agency could constitution-
ally require full reimbursement. Id. at 930 (citing Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. United
States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 601 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1979), cerl. denied, 444 U.S. 1102
(1980)).
63. See supra note 58.
64. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
65. See 43 C.F.R. § 3112 (1983). The applications are referred to as "simultaneous filings"
because each application is for lease of both oil and gas rights. See 1. § 3112.2-1.
66. 690 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1982).
67. Id at 808.
68. Id at 806.
69. Id at 808.
70. Winkler v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1979).
19841
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tion based on inconsequential defects in the application was inappropriate,"'
and ruled that the Ahrens applications should not have been denied.
7 2
The second case concerning the simultaneous oil and gas leasing regula-
tions also concerned the adequacy of a DEC. In Stewart Capital Corp. v. An-
drus,73 the DEC's submitted by Stewart on behalf of its clients did not
contain a statement of agency required by existing regulations. 74 For this
reason the leases were denied in spite of the fact that Stewart had submitted,
and BLM had accepted, applications without the agency statement for over
six years. 75 The BLM's reversal of its policy was based on the retroactive
application of the administrative case D.E Pack, 76 which ruled that DEC's
filed without the required agency statement were invalid.
77
In affirming the trial court's refusal to permit retroactive application of
Pack to the leases submitted by Stewart, 78 the Tenth Circuit applied the
well-recognized balancing test set forth in Retail, Wholesale, and Department
Store Union v. NLRB. 79 After weighing the balancing standards8 ° in light of
Stewart's good-faith reliance on prior BLM practices, and in addition con-
sidering prior case law denying retroactive application of Pack,8 ' the Tenth
Circuit concluded that the Interior Department had abused its discretion in
retroactively applying Pack to the Stewart DEC's.
8 2
D. Construction of Right-of- Way
City and County of Denver v. Bergland8 3 adds one more chapter to the never-
ending saga that details Denver's attempts to construct the Williams Fork
71. Id at 778.
72. 690 F.2d at 808.
73. 701 F.2d 846 (10th Cir. 1983).
74. Id at 846. Stewart had failed to comply with 43 C.F.R. § 3102.6-1(a)(2) (1981)
(amended 45 Fed. Reg. 8545 (1982) (codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3102.4 (1983)). 43 C.F.R. § 3102.6-
1 (a)(2) stated:
If the offer is signed by an attorney-in-fact or agent, it shall be accompanied by sepa-
rate statements over the signature of the attorney-in-fact or agent and the offeror stat-
ing whether or not there is any agreement or understanding between them or with any
other person, either oral or written, by which the attorney in fact or agent or such
other person has received or is to receive any interest in the lease when issued.
Id.
75. 701 F.2d at 848.
76. 84 Interior Dec. 192 (1977), afdon reconsideration, 85 Interior Dec. 408 (1978).
77. 84 Interior Dec. at 196.
78. 701 F.2d at 850.
79. 466 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See 701 F.2d at 848.
80. The standards set forth in Retail, Wholesale, and Dep't Store Union are:
1. [Wihether the particular case is one of first impression;
2. [Wihether the new rule represents an abrupt departure from well established prac-
tice or merely attempts to fill a void in an unsettled area of law;
3. [T]he extent to which the party against whom the new rule is applied relied on the
former rule;
4. [T]he degree of the burden which a retroactive order imposes on a party; and
5. [T]he statutory interest in applying a new rule despite the reliance of a party on
the old standard.
466 F.2d at 390.
81. E.g., McDonald v. Watt, 653 F.2d 1035 (5th Cir. 1981); Runnells v. Andrus, 484 F.
Supp. 1234 (D. Utah 1980).
82. 701 F.2d at 850.
83. 695 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1982).
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Diversion Project. 84 The case involved a right-of-way across United States
Forest Service (USFS) lands granted for water diversion canals that are a
part of the Williams Fork Project. Although the court detailed the complete
history of the right-of-way, 85 the basic question addressed was whether the
USFS was authorized to order Denver to discontinue construction on the
right-of-way in light of Denver's deviation from the right-of-way originally
granted.
8 6
In order to determine USFS authority over Denver's right-of-way, the
court began by defining the nature and scope of the Denver right-of-way.
The Denver right-of-way was granted in 1924 pursuant to section 4 of the
Act of February 1, 1905.87 Under this Act the Secretary of Interior (Secre-
tary) was charged with administering the Denver right-of-way. 88 Although
FLPMA both transferred authority to the USFS to administer rights-of-way
across national forest land8 9 and eliminated the Secretary's authority to
"grant, issue, or renew" rights-of-way over national forest lands,90 the court
held that FLPMA did not affect the Secretary's exclusive jurisdiction over
existing rights-of-way issued under the Act of February 1, 1905.91 Thus,
FLPMA did not grant USFS authority over Denver's right-of-way.
92
The USFS also attempted to rely on the Act of June 4, 189793 as au-
thority for the stop order issued to Denver. The USFS argued that the Act
authorized them to prevent unauthorized construction in order to preserve
national forests from destruction, and that Denver's deviation from the
right-of-way constituted unauthorized construction. 94 The Tenth Circuit
84. The Tenth Circuit's detailed history of the Williams Fork project reveals that the pro-
ject has been under construction since the late 1930's. See id at 469.
85. Id at 467-71.
86. See id at 474, 476-77.
87. 16 U.S.C. § 524 (1982), partzally repealed by Federal Land Policy and Management Act
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 706(a), 90 Stat. 2743, 2793 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (1976)).
See 695 F.2d at 468. Section 4 of the Act of February 1, 1905 provides:
Rights-of-way for the construction and maintenance of dams, reservoirs, water plants,
ditches, flumes, pipes, tunnels, and canals, within and across the national forests of the
United States, are granted to citizens and corporations of the United States for munic-
ipal or mining purposes, and for the purposes of the milling and reduction of ores,
during the period of their beneficial use, under such rules and regulations as may be
prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior, and subject to the laws of the State or
Territory in which said forests are respectively situated.
16 U.S.C. § 524 (1982).
88. 695 F.2d at 468, 475.
89. 43 U.S.C. § 1761(a) (1976).
90. See 43 U.S.C. § 17 7 0(a) (1976).
91. 695 F.2d at 475-76. The court reasoned that because FLPMA expressly stated that it
should not be deemed to work repeals by implication, Pub. L. No. 94-579 § 701(0; 90 Stat.
2743, 2786 (1976), revocation of the Secretary's authority to "grant, issue, or renew" rights-of-
way did not divest the Secretary of authority to administer existing rights-of-way. 695 F.2d at
475-76.
92. 695 F.2d at 476.
93. 16 U.S.C. § 551 (1982). The statute provides in pertinent part:
The Secretary of Agriculture shall make provisions for the protection against de-
struction by fire and depredations upon the public forests and national forests . . .
and he may make such rules and regulations and establish such service as will insure
the objects of such reservations, namely, to regulate their occupancy and use and to
preserve the forests thereon from destruction . . ..
Id
94. 695 F.2d at 476. The USFS also argued that Denver's use of steel culverts constituted
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recognized that, in the absence of the Secretary's authority under the Act of
February 1, 1905, the USFS had the power to issue an order halting con-
struction deviating from a right-of-way. 95 The court found, however, that
Denver's deviation implicated the Secretary's exclusive authority to adminis-
ter Denver's right-of-way. 96 Therefore, USFS had no power to issue its stop
order.9 7 The court then held that Denver could not continue construction of
the project along a path deviating from its original right-of-way without ob-
taining permission from BLM.98
The result of the Cy and County of Denver v. Bergland decision is that the
BLM, and not the USFS, has sole authority over administration of the Den-
ver right-of-way. The case did not, however, resolve all the issues raised by
Denver. Considering that the court left to BLM the determination of the
extent to which the National Environmental Protection Act of 196999 ap-
plies to the Williams Fork Diversion Project, this long-running saga may
again appear in federal court.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
A. Interpretation and Adequacy of an Environmental Impact Statement
The National Environmental Policy Act of 196910 ° (NEPA) requires
the preparation of an environmental impact statement (EIS) to accompany
"every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other ma-
jor federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment."' 0 ' In effect, NEPA requires federal agencies to consider the
environmental consequences of their actions prior to undertaking certain
projects. Determining when NEPA applies 10 2 and the adequacy of federal
compliance with the EIS requirements, 0 3 has led to widespread litigation. '
During the survey period the Tenth Circuit, in Johnston v. Davis,10 5 further
refined the judicial interpretation of what constitutes an adequate EIS.
Johnston considered the adequacy of the final EIS10 6 the Soil Conserva-
tion Service (SCS) prepared in conjunction with the Toltec Reservoir Pro-
ject. 10 7 Plaintiffs alleged that the Toltec Reservoir Project EIS failed to
unauthorized construction because the original right-of-way permit was limited to construction
of canals. Id at 478. The Tenth Circuit agreed that USFS could halt this practice if it was
indeed unauthorized, but found that USFS administrative practice justified treating the use of
steel culverts as authorized by the right-of-way grant. Id at 478-79.
95. Id at 480.
96. Id
97. Id at 480-81.
98. Id at 481. BLM exercises the Secretary's authority over rights-of-way.
99. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
100. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976).
102. For a discussion of when NEPA is applicable to federal agency action, see F. ANDER-
SON, NEPA IN THE COURTS 56-141 (1973).
103. For a discussion of the required contents of an EIS, see id. at 179-245.
104. For a partial list of cases interpreting NEPA, see id. at 298-307.
105. 698 F.2d 1088 (10th Cir. 1983).
106. USDA-SCS-EIS-WS-(ADM)-79--F-WY (January 1980).
107. The Toltec Reservoir Project was authorized pursuant to the Watershed Protection
and Flood Prevention Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1008 (1982). 698 F.2d at 1090 n.l.
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consider certain environmental costs' 08 and applied an unrealistic discount
rate in preparing the required economic evaluation of the project. 10 9 The
Tenth Circuit quickly dismissed Johnston's claim that the EIS inadequately
discussed the issues mandated by NEPA.10 The court held, however, that
the EIS was inadequate not because an artificially low discount rate had
been used, but because SCS had used that rate to improperly represent an
unrealistic economic value for the project. I''
The SCS used a 3.2% discount rate to calculate the present value of the
Toltec Reservoir Project, pursuant to a congressional mandate that required
an artificial discount rate to be used to evaluate all water resource projects
authorized prior to 1970.112 Congress mandated this artificial standard in
order to permit construction of certain projects despite their economic ineffi-
ciency.t" 3 The Tenth Circuit recognized that the SCS was obligated to use
an artificially low discount rate when comparing alternatives to the Toltec
Reservoir Project.1 4 The court concluded, however, that the mandated use
of an artificial discount rate did not authorize the SCS to represent in the
EIS that the Toltec Reservoir Project would yield positive economic bene-
fits.'' 5 Failure to mention the use of the artificial rate rendered the EIS
misleading because the document would not reflect a reasonable comparison
of alternatives to the proposed project. 1 16 The court therefore required SCS
tr/include a discussion of the artificial discount rate in the Toltec Reservoir
Project EIS." 7 The court also held that the EIS must include an economic
evaluation of the project using a realistic discount rate.' 18
III. INDIAN LANDS
A. O and Gas Leases
The Tenth Circuit opinion infcaril/a Apache Trbe v. Andrus '9 discussed
the remedies available to an Indian tribe when the Bureau of Indian Affairs
108. 698 F.2d at 1091-92.
109. Id. at 1092. NEPA requires an assessment of a project's projected economic benefits in
order to contrast the project's value with the value of alternative actions. Id. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(2)(C)(iii) (1976).
110. 698 F.2d at 1091-92. NEPA requires that an EIS address the following issues:
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal
be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be in-
volved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976).
111. 698 F.2d at 1094-95.
112. See 42 U.S.C. § 1962d-17 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
113. 698 F.2d at 1092.
114. Id. at 1094.




119. 687 F.2d 1324 (10th Cir. 1982).
19841
DENVER LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:2
(BIA) failed to comply with the regulation 120 governing notice of oil and gas
lease sales on Indian reservations. 121 Although the Jicarilla Apache Tribe
(Tribe) requested cancellation of the leases based on BIA's noncompliance
with the regulation,' 22 the Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's determi-
nation that the equitable remedy of cancellation was unavailable.123 Can-
cellation was denied because the extensive exploration and development
activities on the leases made it impossible to return all the parties to the pre-
lease status quo.124 Given the impossibility of granting the requested equita-
ble relief, the Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's award of compensa-
tory damages. 1
25
The Tenth Circuit also addressed the propriety of the district court or-
der tolling both the primary lease term and the lessee's payment obligations
during the pendency of the litigation.' 26 Although the circuit court agreed
that application of the tolling remedy was appropriate, 27 the circuit court
reversed the district court's ruling that the lessee was excused from paying
rentals during the pendency of the litigation. 128 One party to a lease will
ultimately suffer the loss resulting from the delay in enjoying lease rights
caused by litigation; the Tenth Circuit determined that the equities required
payment of rent by the lessees.'
2 9
Jolene Crane
120. The regulation in question provided that:
(a) At such times and in such manner as he may deem appropriate, after being au-
thorized by the tribal council or other authorized representative of the tribe, the super-
intendent shall publish notices at least thirty days prir to the sale, unless a shorter period is
authorized by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, that oil and gas leases on specific
tracts, each of which shall be in a reasonably compact body, will be offered to the
highest responsible bidder for a bonus consideration, in addition to stipulated rentals
and royalties ...
(b) All notices or advertisements of sales of oil and gas leases shall reserve to the
Secretary of the Interior the right to reject all bids when in his judgment the interests
of the Indians will be best served by so doing, and that if no satisfactory bid is re-
ceived, or if the accepted bidder fails to complete the lease, or if the Secretary of the
Interior shall determine that it is unwise in the interests of the Indians to accept the
highest bid, the Secretary may readvertise such lease for sale, or if deemed advisable,
with the consent of the tribal council or other governing tribal authorities, a lease may
be made by private negotiations. The successful bidder or bidders will be required to
pay his or their share of the advertising costs ...
25 C.F.R. § 171.3 (1981) (redesignated as 25 C.F.R. § 211.3 (1983)) (emphasis supplied).
121. Both the district court and the court of appeals concluded that Interior's failure to
publish a notice describing the specific tracts, stating the stipulated rentals and royalties, and
reserving the right to reject all bids constituted a failure to comply with the regulations. 687
F.2d at 1331-32.
122. The Tribe also asserted that the leases should be cancelled because BIA failed to pre-
pare an EIS pursuant to NEPA. Id at 1337. The court rejected this claim, however, based on
the Tribe's unreasonable delay in bringing the claim and the Tribe's lack of good faith motiva-
tion in asserting the claim. Id at 1338-40.
123. Id at 1333.
124. Id at 1333-34.
125. Id. at 1334.
126. See id at 1340-42.
127. Id at 1342.
128. Id at 1343.
129. Id at 1342-43.
